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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
BENNETT MOTOR COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MABK L. LYON, THE T·RAVEL-
ERS INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants, 
and 
UNITED STATES FIDELIT·Y AND 
GUARANTY COl\tiPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
9680 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S BRIE.F 
APPEAL FROM THE DrsTRICT CouRT OF SALT LAKE CouNTY, 
UTAH, Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action to recover losses result-
ing from the destruction of a Ford truck which had been 
sold by plaintiff under a Conditional Sale Contract to the 
defendant l\fark L. Lyon. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. Defendant Lyon 
suffered a default judgment and has not appealed. Plain-
tiff made a settlement in mid-trial with defendant the 
Travelers Insurance Company and dismissed the action 
against it. Plaintiff now appeals from a judgment for 
defendant-respondent, l'nited States Fidelity and Guar-
anty Company, hereinafter called "U.S.F. & G." 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judg-
ment in its favor as a matter of law. 
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS 
On or about August 15, 1958, defendant M.ark L. 
Lyon purchased a 1957 Ford Truck from plaintiff under 
a conditional Sales Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1; 
R. 54). Thereafter, and prior to December, 1959, Lyon 
obtained insurance coverage on the truck with two differ-
ent insurance companies which are not parties to this 
action (R. 55, 108-109). Such coverage was cancelled in 
each instance for non-payment of premium, and this 
fact was known to plaintiff (R. 109, 112). 
On or about December 16, 1959, defendant Lyon 
obtained from defendant U.S.F. & G. a policy of insur-
ance, No. C1569348, insuring against ''direct and acci-
dental loss of or damage to" the truck (Exhibit No. 2; 
R. 54) and on January 8, 1960, a loss payable clause, 
showing plaintiff as _ lien_ holder, was issued, without 
premium charge, .as an endorsement to the l~.S.F. & G. 
policy (Exhibit No.3; Finding No.3, R. 55). 
On December -31, 1960, because of Lyon's failure to 
pay the premium, Heber J. Grant Co., the agent which 
wrote the policy for U.SJT. & G., sent a suspension notice-
to Lyon (Exhibit No. 13), and it was received by hin1 
(R. 127). Thereafter Lyon paid a portion of the premiu1n 
but the amount "~as insufficient to maintain the policy 
in force and Lyon-was so informed in telephone conver-
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•) 
:-;ations with representatives of Heber .J. Grant Co. (R. 
l:H); Finding R. 55). 
On April 7, 1960, the Clerk in charge of policy 
cancellation at Heber J. Grant Co. prepared a Notice 
of Cancellation of the U.S.F. & G. policy and placed 
such notice and a duplicate thereof in separate envelopes 
addn':-;~pd to Lyon and to plaintiff respectively, inform-
ing them that the policy would be formally cancelled 
after ten days had elapsed. Necessary postage was 
affixed to the envelopes together with a form of Inailing 
certificate used by the U.~. Post Office Department, of 
which Exhibit No. 17 is an illustration. These envelopes 
after being stamped and sealed were handed to the mail 
clerk of Heber J. Grant Co., together with the mailing 
certificates. The established routine of the cancellation 
(·lerl\: required that before an insurance policy could 
later be cancelled, the cancellation clerk must determine 
that the envelope with the n1ailing certificate attached 
had been received for mailing at the Post Office, and that 
the mailing certificate had been receipted .and returned 
hy the post office official, and only when the certificate 
had been so processed by the Post Office and returned 
eould the policy be formally caneelled (R. 199, 201). 
The lT.::--;.F. & G. policy was formally eancelled by the 
cancellation clerl{ April :23, 1960, as a part of sueh estab-
lished routine (R. 189-202: Finding No. 5, R. 55). 
In the stunmer of 1960, Lyon went to work with the 
truck on a construetion project in Arizona. He obtained 
insurance coverage for his truck under the fleet policy 
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maintained by the general contractor on the project. 
Upon his return to Utah in August, 1960, Lyon applied 
for, and obtained, insur.ance coverage on the truck with 
the defendant The T'ravelers Insurance Co., which issued 
its policy September 15, 1960 (Finding No. 7, R. 56; 
R. 130-131). This policy was issued in the name of Lyon 
but the loss payable clause attached to the policy mis-
takenly showed First Security B.ank of Utah as lien-
holder, even though said bank had no interest in the truck 
or transactions concerning it (R. 132, 137, 139). Upon 
receipt of the policy, Lyon noticed this and other errors, 
took the policy to the Salt Lake City Office of Travelers 
and reported the mistakes. He was .assured by Travelers 
that the mistakes would be corrected. The mistakes, 
however, were not corrected and at the time of the loss 
hereinafter referred to, the Travelers' policy was in full 
effect ( R. 132-39). 
On October 21, 1960, in Uintah County, Utah, Lyon 
intentionally set fire to the truck, causing its total de-
struction. On that date, ·and before destruction, the 
reasonable value of the truck was $6,500.00 (Finding 
No.8, R. 56). 
Lyon reported the loss to Travelers as an accidental 
loss but later admitted that he had intentionally destroy-
ed the truck. He did not report the loss to lT.S. F. & G. 
(R·. 186). 
At the trial of this case on December 19 1961 before 
' ' the close of plaintiff's evidence, plaintiff and defendant 
Travelers informed the court that negotiations between 
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those parties had resulted in a stipulation that plaintiff 
would dismiss its action as to Travelers in consideration 
of the pay1nent that Travelers agreed to make, and plain-
tiff further stipulated that by reason of said payment, 
any judgment obtained against defendant U.S.F. & G. 
would be considered reduced by one-half and as to 
defendant Lyon, plaintiff agreed to give Lyon full credit 
for the full amount of any judgment which might be 
obtained against U.S.F. & G. (R. 173-75). As a result 
of the stipulation between plaintiff and rrravelers, the 
court on January 5, 1962, entered its formal order, dis-
missing with prejudice the .action as to Travelers (R. 33). 
Following the stipulation between plaintiff and Travel-
ers, the trial proceeded as against the re1naining defen-
dants. 
The trial resulted in a judgment in favor of U.S.F. 
& G .. and against plaintiff, no cause of action. On Feb-
ruary ~' 1962, the court signed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment which had been pre-
pared by counsel for plaintiff (R. 34-36, 40). On Feb-
ruary 8, 1962, plaintiff moved for a new trial on the 
ground that '·Under the Findings of F.act made by the 
Court, plaintiff is entitled as a matter of law, and under 
a proper interpretation of the written instruments, to a 
judgment in its favor.'' (R. -±2). 
Also, on February 8, 1962, defendant U.S.F. & G. 
servffi its ~[otion to Amend Findings of F.act, Conclu-
sions of Law and Judgment and submitted to the court 
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with said motion its proposed Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Judgment (R. 43-48). 
On March 5, 1962, the court heard argument on the 
above motions of the parties ,and on March 15, 1962, 
advised respective counsel by letter that plaintiff's 
motion for new trial w,a.s denied, that the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment theretofore 
filed were withdrawn and that defendant -u.S.F. & G.'s 
Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment was granted (R. 50-51). The Court re-
quested counsel for defendant U.S.F. & G. to prepare 
the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and J udg-
ment along the lines of the instruments it had proposed 
to the court, with the exception that the reasonable value 
of the truck at the time of loss was found to be $6500.00 
and the court made no finding as to reformation of the 
policy of insurance issued by Travelers. On :March 29, 
1962, the court signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment as prepared by counsel for defen-
dant U.S.F. & G. pursuant to the court's instructions of 
March 15, 1962 (R. 53-57). The court concluded that 
the destruction of the truc;k was not "direct and acci-
dental" within the meaning of those terms in the U.S.F. 
& G. policy, that the U.S.F. & G. policy was cancelled as 
to plaintiff's interest and not in effect at the time of the 
loss, ,and that plaintiff did not suffer damages as a result 
of any act or omission of defendant U.S.F. & G. From 
the judgment in favor of defendant U.S.F. & G., plaintiff 
has appealed to this Court. 
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STAT ~~~u~~NT PRI~LII\IIN ARY TO ARGUMENT 
As shown by the pretrial order (R. 28), plaintiff 
urged two theories of .action for recovery against U.S.F. 
& G. in the trial court. 
It was first contended U.S.F. & G. was liable for 
"negligent failure ... to give notice of cancellation," 
which negligence, it was claimed, prevented plaintiff 
from securing cover.age against the loss. 
·Secondly, it was claimed the effort to effect cancel-
lation of the policy was "nugatory" because plaintiff 
was not given notice of eanceHation. 
The first of these theories is not argued in plaintiff's 
brief .and has apparently been abandoned in view of the 
fact that plaintiff's own evidenee showed conclusively 
that two separate and distinct policies of insurance, with 
other companies, had been obtained after the cancellation 
date of the U.S.F. & G. policy. 
The second theory-that the policy was not effec-
tively eancelled as to plaintiff-is argued vigorously in 
its brief with copious citation of authorities. The general 
principles of law announced by the cited cases are not 
in dispute here, and defendant will not argue the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support the trial court's finding 
that plaintiff ''",.,as ''notified" of cancellation. 
Argmnent on this point is unnecessary, since the 
issues believed to be determinative of the case, as here-
inafter set forth, show that the Court need not reach 
the question of notification of cancellation. 
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ARGU~1ENT 
POINT I. THE LOSS WAS NOT "DIRECT AND ACCI-
DENTAL" AND SO WAS NOT WITHIN THE COVERAGE 
OF THE POLICY ISSUED BY DEFENDANT U.S. F. & G. 
Under the policy of insurance issued to Mark L. 
Lyon on December 19, 1959 (Exhibit 2), U.S.F. & G. 
agreed under "Coverage F" of the "Insuring Agree-
mentf'," to 
"pay for direct and accidental loss of or 
damage to the automobile, hereinafter called loss, 
caused (a) by fire ... " (Emphasis added.) 
This clause defines in elear and simple terms, as to 
a particular hazard, the extent of the coverage afforded 
and the measure of the liability assumed by U.S.F. & G. 
under the policy. And, of course, only losses which come 
within the coverage definition would be compensable 
under the' policy. 29-A Aln. Jur. 289 (Ins. § 1135); 45 
C.J.S. 616 (Ins. ·§ 674); U.S. Trust ~· Guaranty Co. vs. 
West Texas State Bank (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), 272 
S.W.2d 627. Thus only if the intentional destruction of 
the truck by Lyon in this case constitutes such a ''direct 
and accidental'' loss can it support a recovery under the 
policy. 
In this connection, it may be noted that it is uni-
formly he,ld that an intentional and v~ilful destruction 
of the insured property by, or .at the instigation of, the 
insured does not constitute a "direct and accidental" 
loss within the meaning of the above clause, and hence 
is outside the cover'age· provided by such clause. Leu: is 
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'I'S. Audttrbon Ins. Co. (La. 1953), 62 So.2d 850; Fedele 
I'S. National Li!Jerty Ins. Co. (V.a. 1945 ), 35 S.E.2d 766; 
Federal Ins. Co. vs. lVong (D.S.D. Calif. 1956), 137 F.S. 
:2:~2; Bellman, et al., vs. Home Ins. Co., et al., (Wise. 
1!>:2:2), 189 N.W. 1028; Jones vs. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. 
Co. (TPx ------------), 250 S.W.2d 281; H.(J)rgrove vs. Ameri-
can Ceutewzial Ins. Co., (lOth Cir. 19'42), 125 F.2d 225, 
:2:2~; Odent Ins. Co. vs. Cox (Ark. 1951), 238 S.W.2d 757; 
f{lemens vs. Badger Mutual Ins. Co. (VVisc. 1960), 99 
N.W. 2d 865; Federal Ins. Co·., et al., vs Tam~ami TraiJl 
Tours, Inc., et al. (5th Cir. 1941), 117 F.2d 794, 796; 
Chaachou vs. American Central Ins. Co. (5th Cir., 1957), 
241 F.2d 889; 29-A Am. Jur. 427 (Ins.·§ 1304); U.C.A., 
1953 § 76-6-4. 
In its brief plaintiff attempts to circumvent the 
effect of the above rule by noting that many authorities 
hold that under the type of loss payable or mortgage 
clause endorsed on the U.S.F. & G. policy, known as the 
Standard or Union clause, two separate and independent 
insuring contracts .are effected; one between the insurer 
and the mortgagor and the other between the insurer 
and the mortgagee, and that the latter contract with the 
1nortgagee is not necessarily invalidated by acts of the 
mortgagor even though such acts would clearly invalidate 
the contract with the mortgagor. From these authorities, 
with which this defendant does not take issue, plaintiff 
draws the unwarranted and erroneous conclusion that, 
as to its interest in the truc:k, the policy provided cover-
age against its intentional destruction by the defendant 
Lyon. Plaintiff erroneously concludes that a mortgagee 
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10 
is protected against all losses resulting from acts of the 
mortgagor without regard to coverage provisions in the 
policy under which the loss is claimed. Obviously, such 
a position eannot be sustained. 
This defendant readily concedes that the 1oss pay-
able endorsement issued by it on January 8, 1960, is the 
Standard or Union clause and that, under the great 
weight of authority and .as is seen from its language, it 
effects a separate contract with the mortgagee as to the 
.. loss or damage, if any, under the policy" (Emphasis 
ours.) Further, it is conceded that the separ.ate contract 
may not be invalidated by acts or omissions of the mort-
gagor even though such acts or omissions ·would clearly 
invalidate the policy with the mortgagor. This, however, 
is not to say that the separate contract ·with the mort-
gagee rewrites the insurance policy or enlarges it to 
include a kind of loss not insured against b~~ the plain 
language of the coverage provisions of the pohc~~. 
As is stated in the leading case of Tr.avelers In-s. Co. 
vs. Springfield Fire & llfan·ne Ins. Co. (8th Cir. 1937). 
89 F.2d 757, 761: 
''In order to determine what the contract 
between the insurer and the n1ortgagee is, refer-
ence must necessarily be had to both the 1nortgage 
clause and the policy of which it is 1nade a p.art. 
To ascertain the property insured, the ha.zard in-
sur·ed_ aga~nst, the amount of the insurance, the 
duratwn of the contract, the e.rten.t of the cover-
age) the terms of the corerage, the date when the 
insur.ance takes effect, the conditions under which 
it 'dll remain effective. and the mnount of the 
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pn•mimn, re~;ort must be had to the policy. In 
other words, the policy fixes the quantity and 
quality of the insurance except insofar as it may 
he modified hy the mortgage clause, .and the gen-
eral purpose of that clause is to ma:ke the insur-
aneP provided for in the policy payable to the 
mortgagee as its interests may appe.ar." (Empha-
sis added.) Ree also, U.C.A., 1953 § 31-19-36(1). 
This rule is not in conflict with the -authorities cited 
hy plaintiff as can be seen from the quotation, at page 29 
of its brief, frmn 5 Appleman, Insurance § 3401 at 560, 
to the effect that "the policy terms themselves are not 
nullified h~, a standard mortgage clause ... hut rather, 
.... a new contract containing those (policy) provisions 
i8 made with the mortgagee personally." (Emphasis 
added.) Also, it will be noted that Piedmont Fire Ins. 
Co. r. Fidelity JJ!ortgage Co. (Ala. 1948) 35 So. 2d 352, 
cited by pl-aintiff as support for his contention, states as 
follmn;; at page 3fl-l: of the opinion: 
"\Ye readily agree with counsel for appellant 
that if the loss was not within the cover:age of 
policy contract, it cannot be brought within that 
coverage hy invoking the principle of waiver or 
estoppel. . . . No one, we would assume, would 
agree that a policy of insurance which protected 
one .against loss by fire, could be extended or 
broadened, by application of the principle of 
waiver or estoppel, to cover a loss by cyclone. The 
effect in sueh a case, would be to create a new 
c:-ontraet, without a new consideration.'' 
Sinee, as noted ahove, an intentional destruction of 
the insured property does not constitute a ''direct and 
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accidental" loss, it is clear that the loss in this case was 
not covered by, and hence is not compensable under the 
U.S.F. & G. policy. None of the authorities cited in 
p}aintiff's brief will support .a different conclusion. They 
involve losses that were clearly covered by and were 
clearly within the plain language of the insuring agree-
ment of the policy, and the question was whether the 
breach of a policy ''condition" by the mortg.agor would 
invalidate the policy as to the mortgagee. Obviously 
such is not the situation in the present case where the 
question is simply one of "'coverage'' under the policy. 
In U.S. Trust 4' Guaranty Co. vs. West Texas State 
Bank (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), 272 S."\V. 2d 627, a policy 
of insurance naming the bank as loss payee, under a 
Standard or Union mortgage clause, was issued to the 
owner of an automobile, insuring loss sustained "While 
the automobile is within the United States of America, 
its Territories or Possessions, Canada or Newfound-
land." The automobile was damaged while being driven 
in Mexico by the named insured. The mortgagee bank 
there contended, as does the plaintiff in this case, at 
page 628, as follows: 
"Appellee (bank) contends that the purpose 
of the endorsement was to protect the mortgagee 
bank from the act of the nwrtgagor in taking the 
automobile into Mexico. The hank says that said 
endorsement n1akes .a new and independent con-
tract between it and the insurer and its validity is 
dependent solely on the acts of the mortgagee, 
unaffected by any act or neglect of the mortgagor 
in violation of the 'conditions' of the policy .. ~ . 
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\V"e think said endorsement does not grant addi-
tional coverage under the policy to anyone and 
that the unan1biguous provision that the policy 
eovPrs only aeei<lents which occur 'while the auto-
mobile is in th<' United States ... ' excludes cover-
age of aeridents which occur outside said territor-
iallimib;." (J~mphasis added.) 
rrhe Conrt concluded at fi~D: 
· · \Y e recognize that the clause making the loss 
payable to the mortgagee reg.ardless of any act 
or neglect of the mortgagor, permits the mort-
gagee's recovery despite any violation of a 'condi-
tion' by the mortgagor unknown to the mortgagee . 
. . . The question here is not relative to such a 
matter. The question is whether the accident that 
dmnaged the auto wafl eovered by the policy. The 
plain, unambiguous language of the policy com-
pels the conclusion that while the auto was with-
out the territory eovered by the policy there was 
no eover.age under the policy. This was not a 
condition the breaking of ,,~hieh by the mortgagor 
was, aecording to the contract, not to affect the 
rights of the innoeent mortgagee. The policy sim-
ply provided that there was no insurance while 
the car was without the territory stated .... The 
bank's claim ... was not covered by the policy." 
Another rase. ahnost identieal on its facts to the 
C.S. Trust ea~e. supra, Southwestern Funding Corp. v. 
Jlotors l11s. Corp. (Calif. D.C.A. 1962), 22 Cal. Reptr. 
7S1. reached the same conclusion that policy "coverage'' 
was the smne under the payable clause and under the 
policy itself and that the mortg.age would not be pro-
tected against los~es outside that policy roverage. 
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In a final attempts to evade the effect of the rules 
set forth above, plaintiff points to the provision in the 
loss pay.able endorsement ·which specifically excludes 
from coverage as to the mortgagee, losses caused by the 
"conversion, embezzlement or secretion" of the insured 
property by the insured, and concludes that, since arson 
of the insured property by the insured is not also listed 
arnong those exclusions, it is necessarily covered along 
with all other imaginable losses caused by acts of the 
insured which are not expressly excluded. To sustain 
this contention would indeed be to "extend" the policy 
coverage "without a new consideration" in disregard of 
the ''plain, unambiguous language" of the policy cover-
age provisions. 
The purpose of adding, to the loss payable endorse-
ment, the clause specifically excepting from coverage 
conversion, embezzlement or secretion by the insured 
becomes readily apparent upon close examination of the 
policy provis~ons, particularly when it is remembered 
that the policy and its endorsement .are ''standard forms'' 
designed so they may be used for numerous and varied 
kinds of risks and coverages. The clause ·was simply 
added to exclude from coverage these specific ris:ks which 
would be otherwise covered, if a premium were paid for 
insur:ance, under "coverage G," wherein the company 
agrees: 
"To pay for loss of or damage to the auto-
mobile, hereinafter called loss, caused by theft, 
larceny. robbery or pilferage." (Exhibit No. 2) 
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It will be noted that the phrase "direct and acci-
dental" does not qualify this coverage provision as it 
qualifies the coverage provided under Coverage D ( cov-
ering losses frmn other than collision or upset), Coverage 
E ( eovering collision or upset), Coverage F (covering 
fire, lightning and transportation), and Coverage H 
(providing con1bined additional eoverage). Only the 
insurance under Coverage F is involved in this case. 
It is obvious that without the loss payable provision, 
excluding coverage of those specific acts of the insured, 
the company would he responsible, under Coverage G to 
.a Inortgagee since there is no "direct and accidental" 
limitation on such coverage. The fact that such losses 
resulted from wilful acts of the insured, while providing 
a valid defense to any claim by the insured, would not 
invalidate such coverage as to the mortgagee. 
The addition of these specific exclusions to the loss 
payable endorsement, however, in no way affects the 
n1les stated above, which compel the conclusion that the 
loss in this case does not f.all within the coverage pro-
vided in the U.S.F. & G. policy. The cause of the loss in 
the present case, vi.z, loss through arson by the named 
insured, is specifically dealt with and excluded from 
coverage by the ''direct and aceidental" limitation of 
Cover.age F, as that phrase has been uniformly inter-
preted in the many cases cited at p. 9 of this brief. 
Thus, it would have been a useless and redundant gesture 
to put a further such exclusion in the loss payable en-
dorsement applicable to this case. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
The above interpretation of the policy and loss pay-
able clause as one whole, unified instrument gives mean-
ing to all clauses and provisions ·without i1nporting into 
the policy the unnecessary and unwarranted ambiguity, 
uncertainty and contradiction which would necessarily 
result from the strained construction urged by the plain-
tiff. The construction urged by the plaintiff would, of 
necessity, create an inconsistency between the provisions 
of Coverage F, which exclude coverage, and the pro-
visions of the loss payable clause which, in plaintiff's 
view, ,."tould provide coverage. Such .a construction is 
contrary .to the clearly indicated meaning of the policy 
and loss payable clause provisions as outlined above. 
POINT II. PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM A RECOV-
ERY AGAINST THIS DEFENDANT BECAUSE, BY ITS DIS-
MIS'SAL OF THIS ACTION AS TO DEFENDANT TRAV-
ELERS, IT HAS IMP AIRED THIS DEFENDANT'S SUBRO-
GATION RIGHTS. 
In the event it were held that plaintiff w.as entitled 
to recover under the U.S.F. & G. policy, U.S.F. & G. 
would, upon payment to plaintiff of the amount of the 
loss, be subrogated to the claim of plaintiff against de-
fendant Travelers. Labonte vs. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co. (N.H. 1936), 186 Atl. 6, Papandrou rs. Cale-
donian Ins. Co. (N.:H. 1940), 13 A.2d 735 ~ Zeiger vs. 
Farmers and Laborers Coop. Ins. Ass'n. (~fo. 1948), 
215 S.W.2d +:Z(): 6 Applen1an. Insurance. Section 4074 at 
p. 565. 
In the Labonte case, the plaintiff obtained a policy 
of insurance covering real property which contained a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
loss payable clause in favor of two mortgagees. Plain-
tiff lost the policy of insurance and so obtained .a new 
policy from Phoenix Ins. Co. which failed to mention 
the mortgage interests. Plaintiff then directed the St. 
Paul agent to cancel the first policy, but, through some 
error, St. Paul failed to notify the mortgagees. 
The property was destroyed by fire .and plaintiff 
sued both insurance companies to recover the loss. The 
trial court found that the St. Paul policy had been can-
celled as to plaintiff, but effective as to the mortgagees. 
Accordingly it ordered St. Paul to p.ay all interest of the 
mortgagees and Phoenix to pay the interest of plaintiff. 
On -appeal, the issue was ''whether the Phoeni..x: 
policy was valid; and, if so, whether the total coverage 
should be paid solely by the Phoenix Company or be 
distributed between the two companies" as ordered by 
the court. 
The court first noted that the situation between St. 
Paul and the mortgagees was the same as though the 
mortgagees had obtained the policy themselves .and that 
~t. Paul, upon payment of the loss, would be subrogated 
to the claims of the mortgagees as a matter of law. The 
court's holding is stated thus in 6 Appleman, Insurance 
Section ±07 4, at page 565, n. 64: 
"'Where mortgagor, who had cancelled fire 
policy without consent of mortgagees and had 
taken out policy in another company, brought 
equitable .action against both insurers to deter-
Tiline which policy was in force, original insurer, 
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which was still liable to mortgagees and entitled 
thereby to subrogation, -could require seeond in-
surer, liable for full amount of loss, to pay mort-
gagee's interest directly to avoid circuity of 
.action." 
In accepting a settlen1ent from Travelers and volun-
tarily dismissing this action .as to T'ravelers, plaintiff 
thereby relinquished all claims which it could otherwise 
have asserted against Travelers in connection with this 
particular loss. By so doing, it has deprived this defen-
dant of the subrogation right it would otherwise have 
had to recover from Travelers the amount ·of any pay-
ment made by it to plaintiff. This impainnent of this 
defendant's rights is in violation of the loss payable pro-
vision which states : 
"Whenever the Company shall pay the lien-
holder any sums for loss or damage under the 
policy and shall claim that, as to the Lessee, 1\iort-
gagor or Owner, no liability therefor existed, the 
company shall, to the extent of such payment, be 
thereupon legally subrogated to ·all the rights of 
the party to whom such payment shall be 
made ... '' 
It is well established than an insured is barred fron1 
recovering against its insurer where it has destroyed the 
insurer's subrogation rights against other parties. 6 
Appleman, Insurance, Section 4093 at p. 587, and Section 
4074 at page 565 n. 60; Flame Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Young 
(T·ex. 1936), 97 S.W. 2d 360. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is clear that arson of the insured property by the 
namP<l insured did not bring about a "direct and acci-
dental" loss as that phrase has been repeatedly inter-
pn'ted by the courts. No case which would contradict 
that rule has been brought to our attention. And, the 
validity of this proposition cannot be confined to the 
contract with the mortgagor, as plaintiff urges, for the 
reason that the terms and conditions of the contract with 
the mortgagee must be determined by reference to the 
poliey of which the loss payable endorsement is a part. 
Clearly, the contract with the mortgagee provides the 
same "direct and accidental" limitation as is provided 
in the poliey itself. Thus, the contract with the mort-
gagee does not provide unlimited protection against all 
acts of the mortgagor, as claimed by plaintiff, but only 
against those risks and hazards which come within the 
coverage provided for in the policy itself. The loss pay-
.able clause does not enlarge or stretch the policy nor do 
ri~k~, which are otherwise uninsurable, suddenly become 
covered without premium charge or consent of the in-
surer. None of the cases and authorities cited by plain-
tiff contradict these rules of law. 
The fact that the loss payable endorsement specifi-
cally excludes conversion, embezzlement and secretion by 
the named insured without also mentioning arson does 
not affect the result indicated above. These specific ex-
clusions w·ere added to the loss payable clause to limit 
the company's liability as to risks which otherwise would 
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clearly fall within the coverage provided in Coverage G, 
since that clause is not qualified by any ''direct and 
accidental'' limitati<on. 
Even if it were held that plaintiff could recover 
under the U.S.F. & G. policy, plaintiff has forfeited its 
right to such recovery by the fact that it has destroyed 
this defendant's subrogation rights against the defen-
dant Travelers. Both the right of the insurer to be 
subrogated to the claims of the mortgagee against third 
parties, and the effect of an impairment of that right 
by the mortgagee, are supported by the authorities which 
have considered this question. 
Plaintiff on appeal has the burden of showing that 
the trial court erred and that, except for such error, .a 
different result would have been reached. 
Plaintiff has failed to sustain this burden. Instead, 
the record and the law clearly show plaintiff is not en-
titled to recover against defendant. The trial court so 
found and its judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN H. SNO"\V and 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNO"\V & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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